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BLACK BOX ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND THE RULE OF LAW
JEFF WARD
It seems fitting to explore issues of emerging uses of algorithmic decisionmaking and artificial intelligence (AI) through an interdisciplinary publication
like Law & Contemporary Problems. After all, the AI tools at the heart of these
articles are being deployed in nearly every industry and in every corner of the
globe. This small volume brings together leading thinkers in philosophy, ethics,
data science, computer science, and law, who connect with us from Germany,
Belgium, England, Columbia, and the United States.
This cosmopolitan and cross-disciplinary approach offers particular value for
the exploration of socio-technical systems where AI influences meaningful
determinations, distributions, and allocations of rights and responsibilities.
Precisely because AI affects personal and professional opportunities, due
process, and the rule of law, any narrow exploration set apart from the systems it
shapes—where myopically technological inquiries might fail to include broader
ethical and sociological scrutiny—could be misguided and potentially harmful.
Such narrow explorations might not only fail to prioritize the rights and values
we hold dear but might also undermine our abilities then to govern AI and the
effects it has on the social and political systems we aim to protect. As such, ideal
is a forum like Law & Contemporary Problems that brings together lawyers,
ethicists, technologist, engineers, and others to consider these socio-technical
systems across disciplines. When seeking a positive AI future, it will take a
village.
Such a sprawling topic, though, also requires some constraints. As this
volume’s title “Black Box Algorithms and the Rule of Law” suggests, we have
imposed two constraints here.
First, we focus on a particular subset of AI characterized as “black box AI.”
In his article The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money
and Information, contributing author Frank Pasquale showed that black-box
systems are those “colonized by the logic of secrecy.”1 His article in this volume
adds that “‘black box AI’ refers to any natural language processing, machine
learning, textual analysis, or similar software which uses data which are not
accessible to the data subject, or which deploys algorithms which are either
similarly inaccessible, or so complex that they cannot be reduced to a series of
rules and rule applications comprehensible to the data subject.” In other words,
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1. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 2 (2015).
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the workings of these black box AI systems lack transparency and may escape
our capacities for intuitive explanation.
It should be noted, of course, that all kinds of AI tools—even those using
simple symbolic or handcrafted algorithms that should be intuitive and accessible
to human inquiry—might lack transparency and thus be characterized as black
boxes.2 For example, the algorithms in the infamous Loomis case discussed below
and herein were opaque and inaccessible not because they were complex but
rather because they were protected by trade secret and thus off limits to the
defendant’s review. Nonetheless, much of the present concern about black box
AI derives from the modern technological phenomenon that the AI with the
greatest predictive accuracy is often a kind of machine learning, including “deep
neural networks,” that tends to add opacity. These kinds of AI systems do not
replicate the step-by-step logic and rules that might be intuitive to us. Instead,
they discern patterns from massive sets of examples to produce increasingly
accurate predictions. To achieve these predictive capabilities, the networks
discern relevant features of the data that usually are not obvious, intuitive, or
even explainable to humans. As the use of such tools grows, so too do our
concerns about their black-box nature.
Why should we be concerned? If these new AI tools provide us with highly
accurate outputs, should we care about their black-box characteristics? A
common theme across the articles in this volume is that—in deciding how much
we should be concerned—context matters. A second way in which this volume
constrains the sprawling topic of AI is thus our focus on arenas in which the
deployment of AI touches on the rule of law.
Widely shared across the far-ranging jurisdictions of this volume’s authorship
is a conception of the rule of law where all persons and institutions are held
accountable to legal systems that are clear and publicly manifest, with
independent judiciaries, and whose legal rules are applied fairly and consistently,
enforced without bias, and explained clearly. Quite apparently, black box AI’s
definitional lack of transparency could challenge such conceptions of the rule of
law. Especially in arenas where AI tools assist with decision-making, opacity
undermines demands for public transparency and for the kinds of clear
explanations that satisfy our due process expectations.
Even more, we need transparency into decision-making processes to ensure
their fairness. Black box AI might undermine the rule of law by obscuring biases
and allowing unfairness to persist unchecked. There is a growing awareness of
both the opacity and bias concerns of black box algorithms in due process
contexts, in part because of some recent, troubling cases. Perhaps most wellknown, when a predictive AI system labeled Wisconsin resident Eric Loomis at
“high risk” for recidivism, Mr. Loomis challenged his resulting six-year prison
2. This volume takes an inclusive (perhaps over-inclusive) approach to what constitutes
algorithmic decision-making and artificial intelligence tools such that we include even simple,
statistically-based algorithms such as the COMPAS tool discussed herein. Such a broad view assists our
mutual project of defending the rule of law.
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sentence on grounds that required insight into the workings of the predictive
algorithm used as part of the pre-sentence investigation report.3 As the Wisconsin
Supreme Court denied his challenge, the algorithm remained a black box—a
decision-making tool unavailable to review by and without meaningful
explanation for the one facing deprivation of liberty—because it was protected
by trade secret law.4 For many, Loomis v. Wisconsin was a wake-up call: Even if
this simple algorithm is not representative of some of the more sophisticated
machine learning used widely today, in the wake of this decision, many have
worked to raise awareness of the explanation and fairness issues wrought by
black box AI. As noted, some have highlighted that opacity itself raises due
process concerns where such tools are used in decision-making contexts,5 while
others have emphasized the danger that such tools could undermine fairness and
exacerbate inequalities.6
Here, a moment of caution is warranted for all readers of this volume and all
discussants about the role of AI in our society. To be sure, even our pre-AI social
systems have involved opacity and biases. For example, as our authors De
Mulder, Valcke, Vanderstichele, and Baeck make clear in the title of their article
Are Judges More Transparent Than Black Boxes?, there is a long, welldocumented history of bias in sentencing and judicial decision-making. In this
way, new forms of algorithmic decision-making—by freeing us from the limits of
deeply-entrenched human biases—could potentially offer the opportunity to
enhance fairness. Still, even where achieving such promise might be possible,
many observers raise concerns about the use of AI tools in due process contexts,7
especially where systems trained on historical data might learn and then continue
to replicate existing biases.8 The fear, in short, is that AI systems might not
eliminate biases but instead crystallize and obscure them. It is no wonder, then,
that our evolving expectations would demand transparency and meaningful
opportunities to challenge decisions that are based in some way on the workings
of AI systems.9 Not to do so might impede the full achievement of AI’s promise
3. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760–61 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
4. Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice
System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1369–70 (2018).
5. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA
L. REV. 54, 105–06 (2019). (“automation. . .raises significant due process concerns, involving lack of
notice and the opportunity to challenge the decision.”).
6. Criminal Law—Sentencing Guidelines—Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before
Use of Algorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing—State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), 130
HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1530–37 (2017).
7. See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636, 680, 692
(2017); see Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact
Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 46, 48 (2019).
8. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019) (“To adapt a
computer-science idiom, ‘bias in, bias out.’”); see also, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s
Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016).
9. See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1829, 1844–45 (2019); see also, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory
Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1251, 1256 (2017).
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and ensure some measure of its peril.
With this context in mind, this volume’s collection of articles provides a brief
tour of discussions around black box AI and the rule of law that is end-to-end—
from design to deployment; wide-ranging—exploring areas of civil, criminal,
administrative law, and more; and cutting-edge—challenging what’s next in AI
systems where black-box issues might arise.
In our first article, Beyond the Prediction Paradigm, authors Helm and
Hagendorff look not only at the predictive policing technologies (PPTs) that are
already widely used in many jurisdictions but also to the future as PPTs are
inevitably deployed in more complex areas of criminal policing. These uses raise
important technological challenges for the probabilistic logic of prediction and
concomitant ethical concerns. Even beyond the insights this article offers in this
specific criminal policing domain, it demonstrates the power and importance of
technologists, ethicists, and others working together to address those challenges
and concerns.
Páez’s Negligent Algorithmic Discrimination then goes straight to the core of
the aforementioned concerns about opacity and bias. In an arena like
employment where discrimination is a primary concern, evidentiary issues are
always significant, and the recent rise of the use of algorithmic tools has
heightened the challenges of establishing disparate treatment or disparate
impact. Páez suggests a potential creative evolution of the law of negligence as a
means to meet the challenges wrought by the use of AI tools in employment
settings, and, in this way, the article serves as inspiration for the kind of forwardlooking discourse that the widespread deployment of AI demands.
Pasquale’s Normative Dimensions of Consensual Application of Black Box
Artificial Intelligence in Administrative Adjudication of Benefits Claims offers a
helpful taxonomy of black box AI in administrative functions first by separating
the analysis of such systems between those cases where claimants in
administrative adjudications consent to their use and those cases where claimants
either do not consent or else feel obligated to consent. The article then offers a
normative evaluation of cases where an claimant’s consent is clear. This kind of
careful evaluation is increasingly necessary as black box AI is used more broadly,
implicates benefits and detriments for more and more people, and calls upon
larger, surveillance-driven data sets. Few, if any, have done more in recent years
to elevate awareness and demonstrate meticulous analysis than this author.
As noted above, in Are Judges More Transparent Than Black Boxes?, De
Mulder, Valcke, Vanderstichele, and Baeck help us to recall that judicial
decision-making has always been fraught with black-box issues, even before the
use of modern AI tools. In another clear demonstration of the benefits of crossdisciplinary approaches to the issue of black box AI and the rule of law, the
I also note that some challenge the very notion that transparency requirements or our current
conceptions of explanation into black box AI would be meaningful to those harmed by AI-driven
decision-making. See, e.g., Lillian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 67 (2017).
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authors explore the relationship between traditional judicial decision-making
and the mathematical function maximization behind AI-driven tools. Their
insights help us to ask better questions about rule of law and the ongoing
challenges of uncertainty in legal outcomes.
In the final article Seconds to Impact?: Regulatory Reform, New Kinds of
Legal Services, and Increased Access to Justice, authors Sandefur, Clarke, and
Teufel make clear one of the United States’ most widespread rule of law failings:
the justice gap and the persistence of unmet legal needs for many. By providing
an analysis of a current experiment in the reformation of legal services regulation,
where AI tools might play a very significant role in closing the justice gap, they
end this volume with an appropriate reminder of AI’s potential promise and the
stewardship that will be needed to fulfill it.
I mentioned at this outset that this volume is an international and crossdisciplinary affair, and that describes our team of special editors for this volume,
too. I’d like to offer my warm thanks to my co-special editors: Luciano Floridi is
a leading scholar on digital ethics, the philosophy of information, and the
philosophy of technology who serves as Professor of Philosophy and Ethics of
Information, University of Oxford and Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford.
Cynthia Rudin is a computer scientist who explores how machine learning can be
used to help humans make better decisions and who serves as Professor of
Computer Science, Electrical and Computer Engineering, and Statistical Science
at Duke University, where she directs the Prediction Analysis Lab.
Once again, achieving AI’s best future will take a village.
Jeff Ward
Duke University
Durham, NC
Clinical Professor of Law
Associate Dean for Technology & Innovation
Director, Duke Center on Law & Tech

